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Abstract
Authentication has become a critical step to gain access to services such as on-line
banking, e-commerce, transport systems and cars (contact-less keys). In several cases,
however, the authentication process has to be performed under challenging condi-
tions. This thesis is essentially a compendium of five papers which are the result
of a two-year study on authentication in constrained settings. The two major con-
straints considered in this work are: (1) the noise and (2) the computational power.
For what concerns authentication under noisy conditions, Paper A and Paper B ad-
dress the case in which the noise is in the authentication credentials. More precisely,
the aforementioned papers present attacks against biometric authentication sys-
tems, that exploit the inherent variant nature of biometric traits to gain informa-
tion that should not be leaked by the system. Paper C and Paper D study proximity-
based authentication, i.e., distance-bounding protocols. In this case, both of the con-
straints are present: the possible presence of noise in the channel (which affects
communication and thus the authentication process), as well as resource constraints
on the computational power and the storage space of the authenticating party (called
the prover, e.g., an RFID tag). Finally, Paper E investigates how to achieve reliable
verification of the authenticity of a digital signature, when the verifying party has
limited computational power, and thus offloads part of the computations to an un-
trusted server. Throughout the presented research work, a special emphasis is given
to privacy concerns risen by the constrained conditions.
Keywords: Authentication, Digital Signatures, Privacy, Anonymity, Biometrics, Distance-Bound-
ing, Security.
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Part I
Thesis Summary

1 Introduction
Authentication is the process of determining whether someone or something is, in
fact, who or what it claims to be. In the physical world, with face-to-face commu-
nication, authentication is achieved by showing IDs, passports or different kinds of
certificates. In several circumstances, however, authentication needs to happen in a
digital fashion and under some constraints such as noise, limited storage and com-
putational power. Example of applications in which digital authentication is crucial
are: on-line baking, e-health systems, credit-card payments, cloud-storage services,
access to military facilities, as well as car-unlocking and email accounts. A common
way to achieve authentication is to require an identity, e.g., user-name, and a creden-
tial (e.g., password) for the claimed identity. In more detail, the authentication pro-
cess succeeds if one provides correct answers to the following questions: who are you?
and how can you prove it?
This thesis studies authentication systems in two challenging contexts: (1) when
authentication is affected by noise (either in the environment or in the credentials)
and (2) when the authentication process happens under storage and computational
constraints. The authentication systems considered in this work are based on: bio-
metrics, distance-bounding and digital signatures.
1.1 Authentication in Constrained Settings
The technological development of the last decades has widen the horizon of appli-
cations that require accurate and reliable authentication. Nowadays, authentica-
tion is a fundamental step in services such as on-line banking, e-commerce web-
sites, e-Health, as well as transport systems and border controls. In many cases, it is
desirable that the employed authentication system is, to some extent, user-friendly,
practical and always accessible. These three requirements often imply that the au-
thentication process needs to happen under some challenging conditions such as (1)
noise in the environment (e.g., communication channel) or in the authentication cre-
dentials (e.g., biometric traits) or (2) through computational-constrained devices (e.g.,
smart-cards and Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags).
This work investigates three different authentication systems that are employed
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in noisy conditions, or under resource constrains: biometric authentication, distance-
bounding authentication and server-aided signature verification.
Biometric Authentication. As the name suggests, a biometric authentication sys-
tem authenticates users, e.g., employees in a company, according to some data de-
rived from the users’ body, e.g., an iris or a fingerprint scan. Intuitively, these systems
treat the biometric trait as a unique and complicated password that authenticates
the user's identity. The inherent variant nature of biometric traits, however, makes
the data collecting process affected by a high degree of variability. For example, if
the same user attempts to authenticate twice using her fingerprint, the two scans
may result to two different captured data due to, e.g., difference in finger pressure
or orientation during the scan, and dirt on the surface. Thus, biometric authenti-
cation systems have to rely on comparison mechanisms that keep into account the
innate noise of the biometric credentials.
Distance-Bounding Authentication. From a high-level perspective, distance-bo-
unding authentication protocols combine light-weight cryptographic functions with
physical measurements obtained by resource-constrained devices. A user is authenti-
cated if her device (prover) replies correctly to a set of challenges within a pre-deter-
mined time-frame. The correctness of the responses demonstrates that the prover
(e.g., a smartcard for contactless payments) knows the correct secret key, while the
time limit gives an upper-bound on the maximal distance between the prover (smart-
card) and the verifier (e.g., payment point, contactless card reader), assuming that
the messages travel at the speed of light. In this case, what authenticates the user
are 1) the physical distance of her device (prover) to the verifier and 2) the possess of
the secret key.
Server-Aided Verification of Signatures. Digital signatures are the cryptographic
primitive that provides data authentication, i.e., that verifies the source of messages.
Loosely speaking, the digital signature of a message has the same properties as the
physical signature on a paper document. To guarantee security, however, most sig-
nature schemes rely on strong security assumptions which require the employment
of expensive computations in order to verify the authenticity of a signature. Server-
aided verification has been introduced to enable resource-constrained devices to per-
form verification of such signatures. The main idea behind server-aided signature
verification is to outsource part of the computation load of the verifier (e.g., a smart-
phone or a tablet) to a third party (e.g., a computationally powerful server). Involving
one more entity to perform signature verification, however, makes it challenging to
achieve basic properties such as accuracy, reliability and privacy (signer anonymity).
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1.2 Thesis Objective & Organisation
This thesis is organised in two main parts: Part I is more introductory and provides
high-level descriptions to help the reader to understand the contributions of this
work. Part II is a collection of papers in which the author of this thesis has contributed.
The papers in Part II cover three separate and complementary goals:
1. Finding attacks against existing authentication systems.
2. Designing new authentication protocols.
3. Extending existing security notions and authentication systems to new set-
tings.
The first part of this thesis gives an overview of biometric authentication systems,
distance-bounding authentication protocols and signature schemes with server aid-
ed-verification. Part I concludes with a summary of the contributions of the author
of this thesis in the papers reported in Part II. In more detail, Paper A and Paper B
describe attacks against biometric authentication systems and possible ways to pre-
vent the attacks. Paper C combines an existing light-weight protocol with distance-
bounding authentication. The resulting scheme is a new distance-bounding pro-
tocol for user authentication, which is no longer vulnerable to the known attacks
against the employed light-weight protocol. Paper D is also in the area of distance-
bounding. The paper introduces the notion of two-hop distance-bounding, and stud-
ies how distance-bounding authentication can be efficiently and securely extended
to a three party case (the prover, the verifier and a linker). The last paper of this col-
lection is about digital signature schemes in which the verifier is a resource-con-
strained device, e.g., a smartcard or a smartphone, that carries out the verification
of signatures with the help of an untrusted server. This setting is called server-aided
signature verification. Paper E introduces the notions of anonymity and of sound-
ness after collusion (between the signer and the server) in signature schemes with
server-aided signature verification. Additionally, the paper presents a new efficient
idea for verifying the delegation of the computation of the optimal Ate pairing (which
is a function often employed in signature schemes).
Enjoy the reading!©
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2 Background & Related Work
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the authentication systems
used in the papers collected in Part II. More precisely, this chapter presents the es-
sential background knowledge for authentication systems based on: biometrics, dis-
tance-bounding and digital signatures with server-aided verification.
2.1 Biometric Authentication
Biometric authentication is a quick, accurate and user-friendly way to perform effi-
cient and reliable user recognition. It constitutes an indispensable tool to grant ac-
cess to, e.g., restricted areas, confidential documents or high-level security systems.
The base for biometric authentication is the extraction of biometric traits from the
human body or behaviour. Some biometric traits used nowadays for user authen-
tication are: voice, signature, DNA, fingerprint [40], iris [12], face geometry [30],
gait [34], palm print [25], ear shape [22]. In all cases, the biometric trait is a dis-
tinctive characteristic that is measurable and identifies (almost) uniquely each in-
dividual. There are two main reasons that made biometric authentication systems
become popular. First, biometric credentials have an undeniable strong link to the
user, e.g., one can easily ‘not recognise’ or ‘repudiate’ a signature, but not an iris scan
or a DNA test. Secondly, biometric credentials are considered hard to imitate, there-
fore a good prevention against impersonation attacks. Although biometric authen-
tication systems are attractive and reliable, it is of utmost importance to assure that
they preserve the users’ privacy. The issues that rise when a biometric credential gets
compromised, i.e., captured, cloned, or forged, are particularly severe due to the in-
herit connection between the biometric trait and some physical characteristics of
the biometrics’ owner. For instance, a compromised biometric credential may lead
to identity theft, individual profiling and tracking, and even to disclosure of genetic
information [28], medical diseases [5] and health records [23].
Biometric authentication is based on a matching process: a user is authenti-
cated if the biometric trait she provides is close enough to the biometric template
stored in the system when the user registered. To give an example, consider an ac-
cess gate equipped with a sensor for iris scan. In this case, to perform biometric au-
thentication the sensor can scan the iris of the user, and transform the information
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into digital data (e.g., a binary vector b1 P t0, 1un). The user is authenticated if the
iris scan (called fresh biometrics) matches the stored template (e.g., the binary vector
b P t0, 1un). For biometric credentials, to match means that the vectors b1 and b are
similar. Note that it is not possible to require that b1 “ b since biometric traits are,
by nature, subjected to small variations. For instance, in the case of an iris scan, the
two major causes of a mismatch between b1 and b are the light conditions and the
relative position of the the user and the sensor. These two factors, indeed, influence
the diameter and the shape of the pupil, and the detected colour of the iris.
Figure 2.1 depicts the authentication step of a biometric authentication system.
The parties involved in the authentication process are the user,C, the sensor,S , the
computational server, CS , the database, DB, and the authentication server, AS .
This distributed architecture is employed in [38, 39], while previous works, e.g., [8],
usually consider the simpler case in which the authentication server and the compu-
tational server merge in a single party. The main motivation for the splitting of the
tasks among different entities is privacy: in a distributed architecture the sensitive
information is indeed distributed in multiple entities. In this way, the corruption of
one entity does not lead to the full disclosure of the biometric credentials.
eb
biometric
template 
for     ?cIDComputational Server CSeb0
User / Client
cID
IDC
biometric 
trait
compute the distance 
 
  = d^(b, b0)
Authentication Server AS
determine whetherd(b, b0) < ⌧
OutAS 2 {accepted, rejected}
OutAS
Data Base
Sensor S
DB
transform the biometric 
trait into a digital data b0
Figure 2.1: Authentication phase in a distributed biometric authentication system.
In detail, biometric authentication systems work as follows. The user, C, first
registers to the system, i.e., provides her biometric trait b (called reference template)
and her identity ID. These pieces of information are stored in the databaseDB, ei-
ther in plain-text (i.e., rb “ b and xID “ ID) or in an encrypted form (i.e., rb ‰ b
and xID ‰ ID). In the latter case, the system is called privacy-preserving. Privacy-
preserving biometric authentication systems aim at preventing eavesdropping and
disclosure of the biometric templates. The biometric templates are protected using
cryptographic primitives, such as partially-homomorphic encryption [8, 16, 38], (ex-
tended) private information retrieval [9], or zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [4].
After enrolling in the system, the user can authenticate herself (e.g., to get access to a
military station, or to some data-bank with confidential information), by providing
her identity together with a fresh biometric trait (e.g., finger print). The sensor trans-
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forms the biometrics into a digital information b1 (e.g., a binary vector) and possibly
performs some transformations on it such us encrypting, obtaining rb1. Similarly the
sensor can process on the provided identity ID and computexID. The sensor sends rb1
and xID to the computational server, who queries the database (where the biomet-
ric data is stored) for the reference template corresponding to the identityxID. If the
identity is present in the database, CS gets the reference template of the claimed
identity, i.e., therb provided by the user in the enrolment phase. The computational
server computes the distance between b, and b1 (or the encoding thereof1). The re-
sult of the computation is sent to the authentication server, which authenticates the
user only if the fresh and the reference templates are matching, i.e., if and only if
distpb, b1q ă τ , where dist is an appropriate distance and τ is a threshold value.
The distance function dist, and the value of the threshold τ may depend on
the system, the biometric trait and even the user. For instance, [8, 27] employ the
Hamming distance, [12] performs iris recognition using the normalised Hamming
distance, while [2, 16, 17, 32] employ the Euclidean distance. Finding the optimal
value for the threshold τ is a research field orthogonal to the scope of this thesis. To
give an intuition of the matter, if the value τ is ‘too little’, the biometric authentica-
tion system may reject a legitimate user who provides a fresh template which, due
to the fickle nature of biometric traits, happens to be too far from the stored refer-
ence template (false rejection). On the other hand, if the threshold is ‘too large’, the
system may authenticate an illegitimate person whose biometric credential is not
too far from a client's reference template (false acceptance). Doddington et al. [14]
study the false acceptance/false rejection problem in detail and propose an fun clas-
sification of user called the biometric zoo. In [31], Ross and Jain discuss a different ap-
proach: multi-modal biometrics fusion schemes. The idea behind this method is to
require multiple traits in the authentication phase (e.g., fingerprint, face and voice;
index and middle fingers). In this case, the accuracy of the authentication does not
depend on the threshold value solely, but rather on the fact that the user can provide
several credentials, each one close to some reference template. A theoretical study
on the accuracy of biometric authentication can be found in [33]. The objective of
this thesis, however, is not to improve the accuracy of biometric authentication. The
topics of interest are the privacy and security implications due to the leakage of in-
formation in the authentication step.
1In a privacy-preserving biometric authentication system, the computational server does not have
access to any plain-text information. For instance, consider the case in which the sensorS encrypts both
the fresh biometric template b1 (i.e., rb1 “ Encpb1q) and the identity ID of the user (i.e., xID “ EncpIDq)
using a homomorphic encryption scheme. The computational server can homomorphically compute the
encryption of the Hamming distance (HD) betweenb1 andbasHDprb, rb1q “ EncpHDpb, b1qq, and send
it to the authentication server, who decrypts and authenticates the user if the returned value is smaller
than the threshold.
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2.1.1 Problem Statement
Biometric credentials are often considered as a unique, complicated and secure pass-
word that cannot be forgotten, or as an authentication token that is always available
and can never be lost. Nevertheless, the use of biometric credentials in contrast to
passwords exposes the owner of the biometric trait to severe privacy and security
issues, in case the biometric credential gets compromised (captured or forged).
This thesis investigates how to capture and forge digital biometric credentials,
exploiting the information leaked during the matching process. In detail, Paper A
and Paper B show how to adopt a hill-climbing technique to attack any biometric
authentication system, privacy-preserving or not, as long as it employs a leaking dis-
tance (e.g., the Hamming distance and the Euclidean distance) in the matching pro-
cess. An implication of these results is that assuring security and privacy in biomet-
ric authentication using known techniques (such as secure multi-party computation
and encryption) is a very challenging task. A direction for future work is to mitigate
these attacks using cryptographic primitives such as verifiable delegation of compu-
tations, to prevent the leakage of information to a malicious computational server.
2.2 Distance-Bounding Authentication Protocols
The development of wireless technology enlarged the horizon of application sce-
narios for Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID). Nowadays people are using RFID
tags in everyday life thanks to contact-less smart-card payments, proximity identifi-
cation systems, passive key-less cars and much more. Besides the multiple benefits,
RFID communication systems are vulnerable to a serious weakness: relay attacks.
An example of a relay attack is the following. A businessman, is seated in a cafe´
with his contact-less credit card ‘safely’ put in his pocket. The attacker is equipped
with an antenna that amplifies RFID communications, and has an accomplice in
the jewellery shop next by. When buying an item from the jewellerly shop, the at-
tacker relays the communication between the businessman's credit card and the
RFID-reader of the shop, essentially paying the good with the businessman's money!
Similar attacks have been mounted to amplify the communication range of RFID
car-keys and unlock cars, while the keys are not physically close to them [18].
In order to combat relay attacks, Brands and Chaum [7] introduced distance-
bounding protocols. Classical distance-bounding protocols [6, 21, 24, 29] involve
two parties: the user (called the proverP), and the RFID reader (called the verifierV).
Generally speaking, distance-bounding protocols have two simultaneous aims: (1)
to authenticate the prover, and (2) to bound the prover's distance from the verifier.
The two goals are achieved by employing real-time challenge-response authentica-
tion protocols, in which the round-trip-time of multiple challenge-response pairs is
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used to determine an upper bound on the physical distance2 betweenV andP .
Figure 2.2 depicts the model of a generic distance-bounding protocol.
VerifierV ProverP
xVP shared secret key xVP
Initialisation phase
mV “ g0pxVPq mP “ g0pxVPq
mVÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
mPÐÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ
ξ “ g1pxVP ,mV ,mPq ξ “ g1pxVP ,mV ,mPq
Distance-bounding phase
for i P t1, . . . nu
pick ci in the set of challenges
Start Clock ciÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ
Stop Clock riÐÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ ri “ fpxVP , ξ, ci, iq
store ri and round-trip time ∆ti
Verification phase
verify ri andw, and
wÐÝÝÝÝÝÝÝ w “ g2pxVP , ξ, c1, . . .
check if ∆ti ď t max . . . , cn, r1, . . . , rnq
for all i P t1, . . . , nu
Figure 2.2: General structure of a distance-bounding protocol.
In the initialisation phase, the prover and the verifier use their shared secret key
xVP to produce the session-keys mP and mV respectively. Usually the function
g0 is a random selection of an element in t0, 1uN , for some large positive integer
N . The session-keys and the secret key are input to the function g1, that outputs a
string ξ, employed by the prover in the next phase. The distance-bounding phase, is
made ofn repetitions of a simple protocol:V sends a challengeci, andP replies to it
2The upper bound on the physical distance between the prover and the verifier is derived in the
following way. Set a maximum-allowed distance d. Given that the challenges and the responses of a
distance-bounding protocol are sent via radio waves, they travel at the speed of light (c « 3.00 ˆ
108m{s). As a result, the verifier can state that the prover is within distance d if it receives correct re-
sponses in less than t max “ d{c seconds. Note that the accuracy in the measurement of the round-trip
time (∆ti) is of utmost importance: if the distance bound is set tod “ 30 centimetres – desirable bound
for contact-less payments –, then t max « 1 nanosecond.
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with ri, computed using ci and an opportune function f . To give an example, in the
Hancke-Kuhn distance-bounding protocol [21], the function g1 is a Pseudorandom
Function that outputs two n-bit strings ap0q, ap1q P t0, 1un, and f is simply apciqi ,
i.e., it outputs the i-th bit of theci-th register (whereci P t0, 1u). In the last phase of
the distance-bounding protocol, the verifier verifies that (1) the prover answered the
challenges correctly, i.e., it is authenticated, as it knows the shared secret xVP , and
(2) the prover's responses reached the verifier within the time limit, thus the prover
is close enough. The constraint on the round-trip time of challenge-response mes-
sages (i.e., the proximity test) makes distance-bounding protocols resilient against
relay attacks.
2.2.1 Problem Statement
The most challenging part when designing a distance-bounding protocol is to make
sure that the new proposal is secure against the three following threats:
1. Distance Fraud [7]: a dishonest proverP˚ attempts to prove that it is close to
the verifierV while in reality it is far away.
2. Mafia Fraud [13]: this is a man-in-the-middle attack, the adversaryA is located
between an honest proverP –which lies outside the communication rage of
V– andV . The aim ofA is to makeP appear closer toV , by convincingV that
it communicates withP directly, while in reality bothP andV are communi-
cating withA.
3. Terrorist Fraud [13]: this attack is an extension of the mafia fraud. A dishon-
est proverP˚ colludes with the adversary against the verifier. The aim of the
colluding pair pA,P˚q is to convince V that the prover is actually close by,
when in realityP˚ is far away. Note that, in this threat the prover is dishonest
and helpsA to get authenticated in its behalf.
The reader not familiar with the field of distance-bounding may wonder what is the
intuition behind the names of the last two attacks in the list above. Essentially, these
quirky names are due to the creative mind of Desmedt [13] and have been adopted
as a standard way to refer to the two attack scenarios, although there is no direct
relation between the distance-bounding attacks and actual mafia frauds or terrorist
attacks. Figure 2.3 gives an intuition of the setting of the three frauds.
Since distance-bounding protocols keep into account the round-trip time of the
challenge-response pairs, in order to succeed in a mafia fraud,A cannot simply re-
lay the communication betweenP and V . The hardest threat to protect against is
terrorist fraud. For this reason, different approaches on how to define terrorist fraud
12
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P⇤
A (P)P⇤
distance fraud
mafia fraud
terrorist fraud
P
VA
A (V)
Figure 2.3: The three main threats in distance-bounding authentication. Dishonest com-
munications are depicted in a lighter colour and dashed lines, malicious parties (e.g.,P˚,A)
are highlighted with a grey dot. In mafia fraud, we consider a powerful attacker that imper-
sonates the prover when communicating toV , while, at the same time, it pretends to be the
verifier when communicating toP (possibly using another device in a different location).
have been proposed [1, 6, 15]. The most intuitive one is to consider an attack success-
ful ifP˚ does not reveal its secret key to the attacker (or equivalently, any informa-
tion that will let, later on,A succeed in another fraud on its own).
This thesis contains two papers on distance-bounding: Paper C and Paper D.
Paper C designs a new distance-bounding protocol, which is proven to be resilient
against the three threats mentioned above, while Paper D generalises the idea of
distance-bounding to the case in which the prover and the verifier does not lie in the
communication range of each other, and investigates how the notions of distance
fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud modify in this new setting.
2.3 Server-Aided Signature Verification
Communication technologies and portable devices have revolutionized the way we
manage our personal lives and communicate with other people. Mobile and resour-
ce-constrained devices enjoy an always increasing range of application and capabil-
ities, thanks to the research of new technologies and materials, as well as efficiency
improvements of computational algorithms. Lately, researchers have identified a
new approach to make computational expensive tasks accessible to user-friendly
devices: cloud computing. Users can now access the cloud (a computationally power-
ful server with large storage space), outsource computations to the server from their
personal devices, and obtain results which used to be prohibitive for the device to
compute. This is the setting of server-aided signature verification (also depicted in
Figure 2.4).
The concept of server-aided signature verification was introduced in 1995 in two in-
dependent works [3, 26] and refined ten years later in [20]. The intuition behind it
was to enable a verifier (e.g., a resource-constrained device) to outsource part of the
signature verification process to an untrusted third party (e.g., a computationally
13
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Signer
Sign(sk⌃,m)!   Server
SAV.Comp(pk ,!)! !0
! aided
verification
Verifier
Vsetup(sk , pk⌃,m, )! (!, ⌧)
SAV.Verify(sk , pk⌃,m, ,!
0, ⌧)!  
!0
(m, )
Figure 2.4: Setting for server-aided signature verification. The Greek letter Σ denotes the
keys of the digital signature scheme, while Γ denotes the keys of the verifiable delegation
scheme. The signer signs a messagem using its secret key skΣ and sends the pair pm,σq to
the verifier. The verifier first runs the verification setup to obtain pω, τq, and then it sends
the public outputω to the server. The server computes the outsourced task and returnsω1 to
the verifier. Finally, the verifier checks the correctness of ω1 and determines a decision ∆ P
tK, 1, 0u, where ∆ “ K if the verifier has detected a cheating server, ∆ “ 1 if σ is a valid
signature for the messagem, and ∆ “ 0 ifσ is a invalid.
powerful server). The fact of relying on untrusted entities naturally rises concerns
about the privacy of the outsourced data and the integrity of the outsourced com-
putation. In addition, the server-aided-verification protocol should guarantee the
same security and correctness as the initial signature scheme, and yet be lighter, i.e.,
less computational demanding, for the verifier. More precisely, a signature scheme
should enable a signer (in possess of a secret key) to sign a message, i.e., to produce
a signature for the message, such that the verifier, in possess of the signer's public
key and interacting with the server, can verify the authenticity of the signature for
the message. Authenticity essentially means that 1) the message was created by the
signer (authentication), 2) the message was not altered in transit (integrity) and that
3) it is not possible for the signer to deny having created the signed message (non-
repudiation).
Since server-aided verification protocols involve an additional entity with respect
to standard signature schemes, they are inherently vulnerable to more threats. The
thorniest attack scenario considered in the literature is a collusion between a mali-
cious signer and the server [11, 35–37]. The key of success for a collusion attack is the
face that most of the existing schemes do not check the correctness of the computa-
tion outsourced to the server, e.g., [35–37]. For this reason, [11] proposed to mitigate
the impact of the attack by combining the server aided-verification with a protocol
for verifiable delegation of computation [19]. This last setting is the one reported in
Figure 2.4 for reliable server-aided verification of signatures.
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2.3.1 Problem Statement
Since the introduction of server-aided signature verification, the research commu-
nity put a constant effort at identifying new attack scenarios. The first papers on the
topic considered only soundness and existential unfogeability against the server-
aided verification scheme. More recent works introduced the concept of a malicious
signer colluding with the server in order to tamper with the outcome of the server-
aided verification. Paper E continues along the line of identifying new threats in
server-aided signature verification and formalises two new security notions: ano-
nymity and soundness after collusion. In the former case, the aim is to protect the pri-
vacy of the signer, thus avoiding to leak data about the identity of the signer during
server-aided verification. Soundness after collusion states that after a successful col-
lusion attack, the server should not be able to forge the signature scheme on its own
(using the information leaked by the malicious signer during the collusion attack).
The large majority of the papers on server-aided verification of signatures con-
siders pairing-based signature schemes. In this case, in order to be resilient against
collusion, a server-aided signature verification needs to adopt a protocol for veri-
fiable computation for bilinear pairings. Generally speaking, in such a verifiable
computation scheme the verifier (or delegator), in order to check the correctness
of the outsourced operations, needs to perform some operations on the value re-
turned by the server. In particular, existing schemes [10], require the verifier to per-
form both membership testing and exponentiations in the target group. These two
are expensive operations, whose computational cost is often comparable or even
higher than the one of the bilinear pairing itself. In this context, Paper E proposes
a new scheme that can be employed for server aided-verification of pairing based
signature schemes.
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3 Summary of the Thesis Contribu-
tions
This section provides an overview of the main results of the papers presented in
Part II and explains the contributions of the author in each work.
3.1 Paper A and Paper B
The first two papers of this collection deal with biometric authentication.
In Paper A, we review two privacy-preserving biometric authentication proto-
cols proposed by Yasuda et al. [38, 39]. The protocols are based on two packed ho-
momorphic encryption schemes, that are claimed to protect the privacy of the users’
biometric credentials. We present two attacks in the form of algorithms. The first
attack (Algorithm 1) enables the malicious user (or the computational server) to re-
cover a reference biometric template b using a matching template, i.e., a vector b1 P
t0, 1un such that distpb, b1q ă τ . More interestingly, our second attack (Algo-
rithm 2) shows how the computational server CS can recover a reference template
of an arbitrary user, without a matching template to start with. The main enabler
of this second attack is the lack of verification of the correctness of the computa-
tions performed by the computational server. Namely, CS can tamper with the re-
sult provided to the authentication server and deduce information about the target
biometric template without being detected.
Paper B builds on the results of the previous paper and investigates in detail
the leakage of information that happens in the matching process. I am the main
author of this work, and the creator of the attack algorithms and the proofs of the
paper. The idea of the attack comes from a simple observation: the matching pro-
cess makes use of a suitable distance which measures the similarities between the
two biometric templates. If the distance is sensible to variations in a single compo-
nent of the biometrics (seen as a vector inZnq ), it is possible to recover information
by submitting a fresh template to the biometric authentication system and observe
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the output of the authentication server. My contributions on the paper are:
§ Formal definition of leaking distances (which include the Hamming
and the Euclidean distance).
§ Design of a hill-climbing attack that enables an attacker, exter-
nal to the authentication system, to recover reference biometric
template from a matching one.
§ Statement and proof of the theorems.
§ Identification of different brute-force attacks to find a matching
template without any previous information (in particular, I pro-
posed the tree algorithm).
We note that recovering stored biometric templates has a severe impact since the
same reference template might be used in multiple biometric authentication sys-
tems or leak a match in criminal biometric template databases. Moreover, our re-
sults and proofs hold true also for privacy-preserving biometric authentication pro-
tocols and are not affected by the use of a protection mechanism such as homomor-
phic encryption.
3.2 Paper C and Paper D
This thesis contains two papers in the area of distance-bounding authentication pro-
tocols.
Paper C was born from the idea of fixing a well-known flaw in theHB` protocol
with distance-bounding techniques. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible
to mitigate a serious man-in-the-middle attack against theHB` protocol by simply
measuring the response-time of the prover, instead of modifying the cryptographic
response function (as done in previous works). My contributions in the paper are
mostly on:
§ The formalisation of the proposedHB`DB protocol.
§ The analysis of the accuracy (correctness) ofHB`DBdespite the
errors and noise.
§ The security analysis of the proposedHB`DB protocol.
Until Paper D, distance-bounding authentication protocols were considered to
be executed between the prover and the verifier, lying in each other's communica-
tion range. In this paper, we introduce the concept of two-hop distance-bounding
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authentication. This new setting allows proximity-based authentication in case the
prover and the verifier are not close to each other. The communication relies on an
intermediate untrusted party (the linker), as shown in Figure 3.1.
P
V
L
Figure 3.1: Setting for two-hop distance-bounding authentication. Entities involved: verifier
V , linkerL, proverP .
In this paper I took care of:
§ Formalising the general structure of two-hop distance-bounding
protocols,
§ Generalising the known threats against single-hop distance-bounding
protocols, to the two-hop case,
§ Discussing the security of the proposed protocol, under the pres-
ence of a malicious linker.
3.3 Paper E
The last paper of this collection is a work – currently under submission – on server-
aided signature verification. The topic was suggested during last summer's research
visit at Tokyo Institute of Technology. I am the main author of the paper, my super-
visor and Professor Tanaka's contributions are mostly in suggesting guidelines and
directions of research. Paper E investigates new attack scenarios in server-aided sig-
nature verification (SAV in short). More precisely, we introduce the concept of SAV-
anonymity, and I suggested and defined the notion of soundness after collusion. In ad-
dition, we introduce a rigorous formalism to describe SAV-signature schemes, and
a black-box construction to combine any signature scheme with a verifiable compu-
tation scheme (for the main computation involved in the signature verification).
All the results and the proofs presented in the paper are done by me. Also, I pro-
posed new signature schemes extended to the server-aided verification setting and
investigated their efficiency. Last but not least, I wanted to have a contribution that
would be beneficial in the SAV context, but which is also of independent interest:
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a verifiable delegation scheme for pairing computations which has a different ap-
proach than all existing schemes. Inspired by this idea, I tried to think ‘outside the
box’ and defined a new efficient and private protocol for securely outsourcing the com-
putation of the Optimal Ate pairing. The originality of my approach is to look into the
algorithm to compute the bilinear pairing, and outsource the heavy step, which is
the final exponentiation (in the target group). The computational cost of the sug-
gested protocol for verifiable computation of the Optimal Ate pairing is almost half
of the cost of computing the whole pairing.
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